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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
Troy Evans appeals the district court's decision to summarily dismiss his petition 
for post-conviction relief. He claims that he alleged sufficient facts to demonstrate a 
viable claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, and therefore, was entitled to an 
evidentiary hearing. First, he asserts that, because his defense counsel represented 
both Mr. Evans and his wife, who was also facing criminal charges stemming from the 
same events, and trial counsel negotiated a plea bargain to his wife's benefit at his 
expense, his attorney had a conflict of interest. Second, Mr. Evans contends that trial 
counsel was ineffective because she failed to conduct a sufficient investigation in regard 
to several charges, which he claims would have revealed evidence and testimony which 
would directly contradict a material element of several of the charged offenses. 
Therefore, this Court should reverse the district court's order summarily dismissing 
Mr. Evans's petition and remand for an evidentiary hearing. 
Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings 
Mr. Evans was charged with seven counts of sexually-related conduct. 
(Presentence Investigation Report (hereinafter, PSI), pp.72-74.) 1 Charges 1, 2, and 4 
1 The district court took judicial·notice of the PSI, as well as the transcript of the grand 
jury hearing, and the audio recordings of the entry of plea and sentencing hearings. 
(R., pp.81-82.) The Idaho Supreme ordered the record be augmented with those items. 
(Order Granting Motion to Augment and to Suspend the Briefing Schedule, entered 
February 26, 2013.) The PSI was provided in the electronic PDF file "EvansPSI" and 
page numbers correspond to that document. Included in this file is the PSI report as 
well as all the documents attached thereto (police reports, etc.). 
Additionally, with the three augmented transcripts, there are six independently 
bound and paginated volumes containing the transcripts in this case. To avoid 
confusion, "Vol.1" will refer to the volume containing the transcript from the status 
conference held on March 1, 2012. "Vol.2" will refer to the volume containing the 
1 
addressed claims that Mr. Evans had sexually battered C.S., who was alleged to have 
been sixteen or seventeen when the contact occurred.2 (PSI, p.73.) C.S. had testified 
to the grand jury that she was sixteen or seventeen during the relevant time. (See, e.g., 
Tr., Vol.4, p.22, Ls.13-15.) However, the police reports indicated that officers had 
cross-checked C.S.'s story, and the evidence they reviewed (the dates on the leases 
signed by Mr. Evans and his wife) indicated that C.S. was actually eighteen during at 
least some of the relevant time.3 (PSI, p.92.) 
Subsequently, Mr. Evans's wife was charged with witness intimidation for making 
calls to C.S. (R., p.116.) They were represented by the same attorney. (See, e.g., 
R., p.117.) Mr. Evans alleged that his attorney did not investigate the inconsistencies 
regarding C.S.'s age, nor did she file a motion to dismiss in that regard when he asked 
her to do so. (R., pp.6-7, 66.) Ultimately, Mr. Evans was offered a plea deal whereby 
he would plead guilty to count 7 (sexual abuse of a minor, N.E.), and the State would 
dismiss the remaining charges, and it would also reduce his wife's charge to a 
transcript from the hearing held on April 4, 26, 2012. "Vol.3" will refer to the volume 
containing the transcript of the motions hearing held on July 19, 2012. "Vol.4" will refer 
to the volume containing the transcript from grand jury hearing held on December 15 
and 29, 2009, provided in the PDF document "EvansGJTrans." "Vol.5" will refer to the 
volume containing the transcript from the change of plea hearing held on June 2, 2010. 
"Vol.6" will refer to the volume containing the transcript from the sentencing hearing held 
on August 18, 2010. 
2 Counts 3 and 6 alleged that Mr. Evans had willfully committed misdemeanor indecent 
exposure. (PSI, pp.72-74.) Count 5 alleged that Mr. Evans possessed material 
sexually exploiting a child under the age of eighteen. (PSI, pp.72, 74.) Count 7 alleged 
that Mr. Evans had sexually abused a person under the age of sixteen, N.E., by 
masturbating within N.E.'s view. (PSI, p.72, 74.) 
3 C.S.'s account of the events was based, in part, on the homes in which all the parties 
were living (i.e., a certain action happened when they lived at a certain home). (See, 
e.g., PSI, p.86 ("[C.S.] said when they [were] at the Siltstone residence, she came home 
and found [Mr. Evans] watching a porn movie and masturbating.").) 
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misdemeanor. (See R., p.119; Tr., Vol.5, p.1, L.14 - p.3, L.7.) Both Mr. Evans's plea 
and his wife's plea were contingent on Mr. Evans entering his guilty plea. (R., p.119.) 
At the change of plea hearing, the district court asked Mr. Evans to set forth a 
factual basis for his plea. (Tr., Vol.5, p.9, Ls.22-23.) Mr. Evans responded, stating that 
he had masturbated in his room, unaware that N.E. could see him through the open 
door. (Tr., Vol.5, p.9, L.24 - p.11, L.16.) The prosecutor expressed concern that this 
assertion did not actually admit a crime, and the district court agreed. (Tr., Vol.5, p.11, 
Ls.17-25.) The district court granted Mr. Evans a short recess to consult with counsel. 
(Tr., Vol.5, p.12, Ls.24-25.) During that recess, Mr. Evans alleged his counsel told him 
"to come up with a better story to tell the Court .... " (R., p.72.) Mr. Evans returned 
and told the district court he was aware that the door was open, that N.E. was in the 
other room, and that there was a reasonable possibility N.E. would see him, although 
he did not remember N.E. actually watching him. (Tr., Vol.5, p.13, L.21 - p.15, L.5.) 
The district court accepted his guilty plea based on that assertion. (Tr., Vol.5, p.17, 
Ls.1-6.) 
At the sentencing hearing, the defense presented a witness, C.S.'s brother, D.A. 
D.A. testified that he/she had confronted C.S., pointing out that C.S. would have been 
eighteen years old during the time C.S. said the conduct occurred. (Tr., Vol.6, p.22, 
L.23 - p.23, L.4.) Like the indication in the police report, D.A.'s conclusions about C.S.'s 
age were based on the locations at which C.S. alleged the conduct to have occurred. 
(Compare Tr., Vol.6, p.22, L.23 - p.23, L.4 with PSI, p.92.) D.A. also testified that 
C.S. told him/her that the point of making those allegations was that "I never really liked 
[Mr. Evans], and I just wanted to do away with him." (Tr., Vol.6, p.22, Ls.13-16.) 
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The district court ultimately imposed a unified sentence of fifteen years, with five 
years fixed, and retained jurisdiction. (R., p.102.) Mr. Evans successfully completed 
that period of retained jurisdiction and was placed on probation. (R., p.102.) After 
Mr. Evans admitted to violating the terms of his probation, the district court revoked his 
probation. (R., p.102-03.) Mr. Evans did not file a direct appeal in this matter. 
(R., p.103.) 
However, Mr. Evans did file a petition for post-conviction relief. (R., pp.5-7.) 
He alleged, among other things, that his attorney provided ineffective assistance by 
representing both him and his wife, even though doing so created a conflict of interest, 
and by not sufficiently investigating the charges filed with regard to C.S. (R., pp.6-7, 
66-67, 71-72.) He alleged that, had his attorney properly investigated charges 1, 2, 
and 4, "Petitioner would no[t] have entered his guilty plea but instead would have 
gone to trial." (R., pp.6-7.) He added, in a subsequent affidavit that, had counsel 
proceeded effectively and investigated the evidence regarding C.S.'s age, he "would 
have proceeded differently in this case." (R., p.72.) In regard to the dual representation 
claim, Mr. Evans asserted that he felt the plea was coerced and not knowing, intelligent, 
or voluntary as a result of counsel's pressure to enter that plea. (R., pp.67, 72.) 
The State denied those allegations and moved for summary dismissal of the claims. 
(R., pp.32-35, 46-48, 83-94.) 
The district court granted the State's motion for summary dismissal. (R., p.122.) 
In regard to the insufficient investigation claim, the district court determined that 
Mr. Evans had not sufficiently alleged what evidence counsel would have uncovered 
with more investigation. (R., pp.108-09.) It also held that he had not sufficiently 
4 
articulated the prejudice caused him by the alleged defective performance. 
(R., pp.109-10.) In addition, it pointed out that he had responded on his guilty plea 
questionnaire that there was nothing he had requested his attorney to do that had not 
been done, nor were there witnesses he felt his attorney should have investigated. 
(R., p.110.) As such, it determined Mr. Evans had not made a sufficient showing to 
survive summary dismissal on this claim. (R., p.112.) In regard to the dual 
representation claim, the district court determined that Mr. Evans "has not shown, by a 
preponderance of the evidence, such actual conflict of interest existed . . . ." 
(R., pp.119-20.) Mr. Evans filed a timely notice of appeal from the judgment entered by 
the district court. (R., pp.124-26.) 
5 
ISSUES 
1. Whether the district court erred by summarily dismissing Mr. Evans' claim that his 
defense counsel provided ineffective assistance by representing both Mr. Evans 
and his co-defendant. 
2. Whether the district court erred by summarily dismissing Mr. Evans' claim that his 
defense counsel provided ineffective assistance by not conducting a sufficient 




The District Court Erred By Summarily Dismissing Mr. Evans' Claim That His Defense 
Counsel Provided Ineffective Assistance By Representing Both Mr. Evans And His 
Co-Defendant 
A. Introduction 
Mr. Evans contends that his attorney provided ineffective assistance by 
representing him even though there was an actual conflict in that representation 
because trial counsel was also representing his wife, whose interests were at odds with 
Mr. Evans's. When an attorney represents co-defendants and their interests become 
conflicting, continued representation of both defendants constitutes deficient 
performance. Mr. Evans contends that such a situation emerged in this case, when the 
plea deals offered to both defendants were contingent on Mr. Evans pleading to a 
felony, while his co-defendant would have her charges reduced to a misdemeanor. The 
problem became evident when Mr. Evans was unable to articulate a factual basis for his 
plea and his attorney pressured him to come up with a better story for the district court. 
Since these facts, when liberally construed in Mr. Evans's favor, would entitle him to 
relief, summary dismissal was inappropriate. Therefore, this Court should reverse the 
district court's erroneous order summarily dismissing Mr. Evans's petition and remand 
this case for an evidentiary hearing. 
B. Standard Of Review 
Post-conviction cases are civil in nature. Baldwin v. State, 145 Idaho 148, 153 
(2008). In post-conviction cases, a petition may be summarily dismissed only if it does 
not present a genuine issue of material fact. Id.; see I.C. § 19-4906(b). In determining 
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whether a genuine issue of material fact exists, "[a] court is required to accept the 
petitioner's unrebutted allegations as true . . . ."4 Baldwin, 145 Idaho at 153; 
Saykhamchone v. State, 127 Idaho 319, 321 (1995). Facts set forth in a verified 
pleading carry the same weight as facts set forth in an affidavit. Mata v. State, 124 
Idaho 588, 593 (Ct. App. 1993). At the summary judgment phase, the courts "liberally 
construe the facts and reasonable inferences in favor of the non-moving party."5 
Nevarez v. State, 145 Idaho 878, 881 (Ct. App. 2008); see also Charboneau v. State, 
140 Idaho 789, 792 (2004) ("[l]nferences [are] liberally construed in favor of the 
petitioner."). When a genuine issue of material fact exists and would, if resolved in the 
petitioner's favor, entitle the petitioner for relief, the district court must conduct an 
evidentiary hearing. Baldwin, 145 Idaho at 153; Berg v. State, 131 Idaho 517, 518 
(1998). 
To show a genuine issue of material fact in regard to a claim of ineffective 
assistance of counsel, the petitioner must allege facts which demonstrate that counsel's 
performance fell below a reasonable standard and that the petitioner was prejudiced by 
that deficient performance. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984); 
McKeeth v. State, 140 Idaho 847, 850 (2004). In regard to the second prong of the 
Strickland test, a petitioner shows prejudice when he demonstrates that there is a 
4 Where, as in this case, the State does provide an answer that denies the allegations 
(R., pp.33, 83), its denials do not affirmatively disprove the claims. Rather, they only 
creates genuine issues of material fact in regard to those issues, specifically, whether or 
not the petitioner's claims are factually accurate. Because a genuine issue of material 
fact exists in such cases, summary dismissal is inappropriate. Baldwin, 145 Idaho at 
153. 
5 In this case, the State is the moving party. (R., pp.46-49, 87-94.) Therefore, the facts 
and reasonable inferences are liberally construed in Mr. Evans's favor. Charboneau, 
140 Idaho at 792; Nevarez, 145 Idaho at 881. 
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reasonable probability that the outcome would have been different, or, in other words, 
he must undermine confidence in the outcome. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694; 
McKay v. State, 148 Idaho 567, 570 (2010). In cases where the petitioner alleges 
ineffective assistance during the plea bargain and agreement stage of his case, he must 
show '"there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's errors, he would not have 
pleaded guilty and would have insisted on going to trial."' Booth v. State, 151 Idaho 
612, 621 (2011) (quoting Ridgley v. State, 148 Idaho 671, 676 (2010) (quoting 
Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 59 (1985))). 
C. The Plea Agreement. Which Benefits Mr. Evans's Wife At His Expense, Created 
An Actual Conflict In Their Interests; Thus. Counsel's Dual Representation Of 
Both Mr. Evans And His Wife Constitutes A Basis For Post-Conviction Relief 
As an initial matter, the district court prematurely applied the preponderance of 
the evidence standard to this issue when it considered the state's motion for summary 
dismissal. (See R., pp.119-20.) At the summary disposition stage, all the petitioner is 
required to show is a genuine issue of material fact because the question is whether or 
not an evidentiary hearing needs to be held, not whether the claims have been proven. 
See Baldwin, 145 Idaho at 153. It is at that subsequent evidentiary hearing that he is 
required to prove his claims by a preponderance of the evidence. See, e.g., 
Nguyen v. State, 121 Idaho 257, 258 (Ct. App. 1992) ("In a post-conviction relief 
hearing, the petitioner has the burden of proving the allegations which entitle him to 
relief by a preponderance of the evidence." (emphasis added)). Therefore, the district 
court's decision, based on the application of an improper standard, should be reversed. 
As to the merits of Mr. Evans's claim regarding dual representation, one of the 
aspects of the constitutional guarantee to counsel is the "right to representation free 
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from conflicts of interest."6 State v. Koch, 116 Idaho 571,574 (Ct. App. 1989); see also 
Wood v. Georgia, 450 U.S. 261, 271 (1981); Cuyler v. Sullivan, 446 U.S. 335, 
345 (1980). Joint representation of a co-defendant may, but will not always, constitute 
ineffective assistance. Giles v. State, 125 Idaho 921, 923 (1993); State v. Guzman, 126 
Idaho 368, 371 (Ct. App. 1994). "In order to establish a violation of the Sixth 
Amendment, a defendant who raised no objection at trial must demonstrate an actual 
conflict of interest adversely affected his lawyer's performance. "7 Cuyler, 446 U.S. at 
348; State v. Severson, 147 Idaho 694, 703 (2009). Actual conflicts arise when counsel 
'"actively represented conflicting interests."' Guzman, 126 Idaho at 371 (quoting Koch, 
116 Idaho at 574). Basically, an actual conflict exists when the lawyer's representation 
of one client will be directly adverse to the interests of another client, or where there is a 
significant risk that the representation of a client will materially limit her ability to fulfill 
her responsibilities to another client. I.R.P.C. 1.7. And, when the petitioner 
demonstrates that such a situation adversely affected counsel's representation of him in 
this manner, prejudice is presumed. Guzman, 126 Idaho at 371. 
Mr. Evans contends that an actual conflict is evident in his case. The plea offer 
provided that Mr. Evans would plead guilty to sexual battery of a minor and, in 
6 The Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution promise 
the right to counsel during a criminal prosecution. U.S. CONST. amends. VI, XIV. The 
Idaho Constitution provides similar assurances. IDAHO CONST. art. 1, § 13. 
7 Generally, when no objection to the dual representation is raised before the trial court, 
the trial court is entitled to assume that no conflict exists or that the defendant knowingly 
accepted the risk of such a conflict. Cuyler, 446 U.S. at 347; Guzman, 126 Idaho at 
371. This allows the district courts to rely on the good faith and judgment of counsel in 
such situations. Cuyler, 446 U.S. at 346-47. However, that presumption may be 
overcome if the petitioner makes a particularized showing of an actual conflict. See 
Koch, 116 Idaho at 574. 
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exchange, the State would dismiss the remaining charges against him and would 
reduce the charges against his wife to a misdemeanor. (R., p.119; see Tr., Vol.5, p.1, 
L.16 - p.3, L.6.) In fact, both pleas were contingent on Mr. Evans accepting this deal. 
(R., p.119.) Such situations, while not automatically fatal to a plea, do still need to be 
considered in regard to post-conviction claims. McNee/ey v. State, 111 Idaho 200, 203 
(Ct. App. 1986). At the district court's request, Mr. Evans then attempted to set forth a 
factual basis for this plea. (Tr., Vol.5, p.9, L.22 - p.10, L.16.) He said that he was 
masturbating in the bedroom and his daughter looked in and saw him without his 
knowledge. (Tr., Vol.5, p.9, L.22 - p.10, L.2.) The prosecutor expressed concern that 
Mr. Evans's statements did not set forth a factual basis for the crime charged, as the 
statute did not extend to cover unintentional exposure, and the district court agreed. 
(Tr., Vol.4, p.11, Ls.19-25.) It granted a short recess for Mr. Evans to discuss the 
matter with his attorney. (Tr., Vol.4, p.12, Ls.18-25.) In his affidavit, Mr. Evans asserted 
that, during that recess, his attorney told him to "come up with a better story to tell the 
Court." (R., p.72.) As such, Mr. Evans asserted that he felt pressured into entering into 
this plea agreement. (R., p.72.) 
Since the courts must accept Mr. Evans's unrebutted, verified factual allegations 
as true, and it must also construe the facts and reasonable inferences from those facts 
in favor of Mr. Evans, summary judgment was inappropriate. See Charboneau, 140 
Idaho at 792; Nevarez, 145 Idaho at 881. Mr. Evans's struggle to articulate a factual 
basis for the plea, combined with counsel's subsequent statement to come up with a 
better story, indicates that Mr. Evans was pleading guilty to crime which he did not 
believe he had committed. (See also R., p.6 (indicating that Mr. Evans believed he 
11 
entered an Alford plea)8; R., p.33 (the State denying that Mr. Evans actually entered his 
plea pursuant to Alford).) When combined with the fact that both pleas hinged on his 
entry of that plea, the facts, liberally construed in Mr. Evans's favor, indicate that 
Mr. Evans's interests were at odds with his wife's, and that counsel was no longer able 
to fulfill all her responsibilities to Mr. Evans. These facts would entitle Mr. Evans to 
relief because they show deficient performance by the attorney (representing Mr. Evans 
despite an actual conflict of interests) and because the actual conflict appears to have 
affected the representation, prejudice is presumed. See, e.g., Guzman, 126 Idaho at 
371. Therefore, summary dismissal was inappropriate, and the district court's order to 
that effect was erroneous; an evidentiary hearing on this claim is needed. Baldwin, 145 
Idaho at 153; Berg, 131 Idaho at 518. 
II. 
The District Court Erred By Summarily Dismissing Mr. Evans' Claim That His Defense 
Counsel Provided Ineffective Assistance By Not Conducting A Sufficient Investigation 
Of The Charges Filed Against Mr. Evans 
A. Introduction 
Mr. Evans contends that his attorney provided ineffective assistance by not 
sufficiently investigating the charges filed against him. Specifically, he contends that 
counsel failed to investigate indications in the police report that undermined elements of 
three of the charges levied against Mr. Evans; nor did trial counsel any pretrial motions 
challenging those charges in that regard. Rather, counsel negotiated the problematic 
8 Pursuant to North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25 (1970), a defendant may enter a 
plea of guilty while still asserting factual innocence or lack of memory as to the facts of 
the offense. See Shogar v. State, 148 Idaho 622, 629 n.4 (2009). 
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plea deal discussed supra while those potentially-improper charges were still pending. 
Mr. Evans alleged that, had counsel engaged in a sufficient investigation in this regard, 
he would have proceeded differently, rejected the plea deal, and insisted on a trial. 
Therefore, as the facts alleged, construed liberally in Mr. Evans's favor, would have 
entitled him to relief, summary dismissal was inappropriate. An evidentiary hearing was 
required. Therefore, this Court should reverse the district court's erroneous order 
summarily dismissing Mr. Evans's petition and remand for an evidentiary hearing. 
B. Mr. Evans's Trial Attorney Provided Ineffective Assistance By Not Conducting A 
Sufficient Investigation Of The Charges In His Case 
Counsel has a duty to conduct a reasonable, prompt, and thorough investigation. 
Mitchell v. State, 132 Idaho 274, 280 (1998). To show that counsel has conducted an 
unreasonable investigation, the petitioner needs to show what information the 
reasonable investigation would have revealed. Id. The courts are to consider not only 
the evidence known to counsel, but also whether that "known evidence would lead a 
reasonable attorney to investigate further." Murphy v. State, 143 Idaho 139, 146 
(Ct. App. 2006). "Moreover, counsel is bound to make reasonable efforts to obtain and 
review material that the prosecution will probably rely on as evidence." Id. 
In this case, the police reports indicated that, while C.S. had made claims of 
inappropriate conduct by Mr. Evans, there was evidence which indicated that those 
claims may not be criminal because C.S. would have been eighteen at the time of the 
conduct. (PSI, p.92.) Specifically, officers cross-checked C.S.'s story with Mr. and 
Ms. Evans's lease information, and the dates gathered from the leases suggested 
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C.S. would have been eighteen during at least some of the relevant time.9 (PSI, p.92.) 
Mr. Evans pointed out that those reports differed from the testimony C.S. offered during 
the grand jury proceedings. 10 (R., pp.6-7.) Since the three charges ultimately filed in 
regard to C.S. each alleged that he/she was sixteen or seventeen years old, a 
reasonable attorney would have conducted a further investigation based on the 
indications in the police report. See Murphy, 143 Idaho at 146. Yet, according to 
Mr. Evans's verified allegations, counsel did not follow up on this information. 
(R., pp.6-7, 66, 71-72.) Additionally, he alleged that he requested counsel to file a 
9 This information was subsequently corroborated by C.S.'s brother, D.A., who testified 
that C.S. talked with him about the allegations, and, by his calculation based on C.S.'s 
allegations, C.S. would have been eighteen at the time of the contacts. (Tr., Vol.6, p.21, 
L.23 - p.23, L.6.) Furthermore, D.A. said he asked C.S. what the point of the allegations 
was, and she responded that "I never really liked [Mr. Evans], and I just wanted to do 
away with him." (Tr., Vol.6, p.22, Ls.11-16.) 
However, the district court attempted to use this information to justify its decision 
to summarily dismiss Mr. Evans's claim: "if counsel had not interviewed the victims of 
the dismissed counts, counsel would not have known to call the witness she called at 
sentencing." (R., p.112.) D.A.'s testimony indicated that the conversation with C.S. did 
not take place until after Mr. Evans entered his guilty plea on June 2, 2010. ( See 
Tr., Vol.6, p.17, L.24 - p.18, L.3 (Counsel asked D.A., "In the last few weeks, I believe 
leading up to the last time Mr. Evans was in court on August 4, [201 O,] did you have an 
opportunity to have a conversation with [C.S.]?" D.A. indicated that was correct.) As 
such, the district court's conclusion that calling D.A. indicated a sufficient investigation 
by trial counsel is clearly erroneous. Nothing about counsel's calling D.A. at the 
sentencing hearing indicates that she conducted a sufficient investigation before 
Mr. Evans entered his guilty plea. Therefore, Mr. Evans's allegations of fact remain 
uncontradicted, to be accepted as true at the summary dismissal phase. Baldwin, 145 
Idaho at 153. At most, there is a genuine issue of material fact as to whether counsel 
conducted these interviews before the guilty plea, and that still requires an evidentiary 
hearing. Id. Therefore, the district court's order summarily dismissing this claim was in 
error. 
1° For example, C.S. testified to the grand jury that he/she was still sixteen during the 
first contact, rather than nearly eighteen, as the police reports indicated. (Compare 
Tr., Vol.4, p.22, Ls.13-15 with PSI, p.92.) 
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motion to dismiss those charges on this basis, but counsel did not do so.11 (R., pp.71-
72.) Therefore, the evidence, construed liberally in Mr. Evans's favor, indicates that 
counsel provided deficient performance by not following up on the legitimate concern 
that three of the charges levied against him were improper, and thus, counsel's 
performance was deficient. See Mitchell, 132 Idaho at 280; Murphy, 143 Idaho at 146. 
Mr. Evans also alleged that, had counsel performed this investigation and filed 
the appropriate motions, "Petitioner would have no[t] entered his guilty plea but instead 
would have gone to trial." (R., p.7.) Mr. Evans subsequently affirmed that had counsel 
conducted a sufficient investigation, "I would have proceeded differently in this case."12 
(R., p. 72.) Those verified allegations demonstrate the prejudice required under 
Strickland - there is a reasonable probability that Mr. Evans would not have pied guilty 
at the time he did. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694; Booth, 151 Idaho at 621; McKay, 148 
Idaho at 570. Therefore, because Mr. Evans alleged facts which demonstrate his 
attorney provided deficient performance and that he was prejudiced by that deficient 
performance, the district court's order summarily dismissing his petition was erroneous. 
11 The failure to file a pre-trial motion may also constitute ineffective assistance if it can 
be determined that, if pursued, the motion would likely have been successful. See 
State v. Hairston, 133 Idaho 496, 512 (1999). 
12 Post-conviction counsel indicated that Mr. Evans preferred to rely on the statements 
in the amended affidavit, as they "flushed [sic] out [the issue] better." (Tr., Vol.2, p.2, 
Ls.11-15.) The district court asked if this meant that Mr. Evans was withdrawing his 
original statement and substituting the initial statement with the one from the amended 
petition, and counsel affirmed that was so. (Tr., Vol.2, p.2, Ls.16-19.) Based on this 
discussion, it is evident that, by asserting, "I would have proceeded differently in this 
case," Mr. Evans was referring to his initial assertion that he would not have pied guilty, 
had counsel conducted a sufficient investigation, since he was only trying to flesh the 
issue out, rather than make a new or different assertion. (See Tr., Vol.2, p.2, Ls.11-15.) 
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The district court pointed to the answers in Mr. Evans's guilty plea questionnaire 
to justify its decision to summarily dismiss this claim. (R., p.110.) However, that 
information does not definitively disprove Mr. Evans's verified allegations. Rather, all it 
does is create a genuine issue of material fact - whether or not Mr. Evans's attorney did 
perform a sufficient investigation. It is entirely possible that Mr. Evans did not learn of 
his attorney's deficient performance in this regard until after he had filled out the 
questionnaire and entered his guilty plea. In that case, neither statement would be 
false, but there would still be an issue which, if true, would entitle Mr. Evans to post-
conviction relief. The critical point is that, at the summary dismissal stage, the facts are 
to be liberally construed in favor of the petitioner." Charboneau, 140 Idaho at 792. To 
construe these facts in Mr. Evans's favor means that the allegations in the petition 
would be viewed as correct. See id. If the allegations are correct, Mr. Evans would be 
entitled to relief, an evidentiary hearing was necessary. Baldwin, 145 Idaho at 153. 
Therefore, since the guilty plea questionnaire at most creates a genuine issue of 
material fact, summary dismissal was inappropriate. Id. 
CONCLUSION 
Mr. Evans respectfully requests this Court reverse the district court's order 
summarily dismissing his petition for post-conviction relief and remand the case for an 
evidentiary hearing. 
DATED this 18th day of June, 2013. 
I' /)/ 
~ d@= -
BRIAN R. DICKSON 
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender 
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